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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director, Intellig	gence Communi	ty Staff	2	25X1
FROM:	Chairman				
SUBJECT:	Prepublication Review Pro	oject Report		2	25X1
Services, CIA reassist the NSC S prepublication reof the project, number of disclo	d is a "for the record" regarding the review of almotaff in establishing a neweview requirements and unathe NSC Staff agreed to shours which were averted to reported to Mr. deGraffe	ost 500 publi kus between t authorized di nift the effo through prepu	cations in an endemonerate control of the categories. In the categories can be categories as a categories and categories as a	ffort to the midst of the w. This 13	25x1
damaging, could in say that prepublication rit is uniformly important, becau prepublication r	the disclosures uncovered not be considered disastron report appear in subparation review has little eview is a valuable way to applied at all levels. These it recognizes that lead eview agreements. The lead aking is a covert activity	ous. The mosagraphs 5c ar to do with lo prevent inance conclusion cers will notaker is never	it important cond d 5d. These es eaks, per se, a dvertent disclo i in 5c is most be deterred by identified by	clusions sentially nd that sures, if the not	25X1 25X1
should continue	mary lesson to be learned to support prepublication ct the perpetrators of una	review, we d	annot consider	it a way assified	25X1
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 The report is furnished for copy of a memorandum transmitting the 	your ne OIS	information. report to Mr.	Also attached is a de Graffenreid, at	
whose request the review was begun.				

Attachment:

- A. Report from D/IS
- B. Memo to DeGraffenreid

CC: C/Publications Review Board, CIA, w/atts
C/UDIS/SECOM, w/atts
CIA Member, SECOM, w/atts
D/Information Services, CIA, w/att B A A

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2 SECRET 6 June 1984
Prepared by: C/SECOM


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
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- 5 D/IS, w/atts A&B
- 6 ICS REGISTRY, w/atts A&B
- 7 SECOM Chrono, w/atts A&B
- 8 SECON Subject, w/atts A&B



	16 MAY 1984	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Chairman, SECOM	
FROM:	Director of Information Commisse DA	25X1
SUBJECT:	Director of Information Services, DA	
CODOBCT.	Results of Task Force Effort to Support Prepublication Review Element of NSDD-84	25X1
1. To deve	elop support for the prepublication review requirement in	
officials with a prepublication rethat had been did this was not consee paragraph 50 Information Service support provided and Technology, with a list, compublished by for review. These is journals. Befor complete its wor	force was created to review the writings of former government access to SCI who had published writings not submitted for review. The Task Force was to look for classified information asclosed because there was no prepublication review requirement. It is below. The Task Force was organized under the Office of rices (OIS), Directorate of Administration with additional by the Directorates of Operations, Intelligence, and Science and by the Office of Security. The Task Force was provided piled by the National Security Council, of 536 writings mer Government officials without the benefit of prepublication included books, monographs, and articles in newspapers and the the Task Force could review all of this material and the project was overtaken by events when implementation of ended. This report of the Task Force results is being submitted	25X1
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they discuss. This gives great veracity to their words and worsens the damage that they can cause. It is this kind of constant hemorrhaging of our sensitive information bit by bit that feeds the perception already held by many, and that number is being added to every day, that the U.S. Government is unable to keep secrets and could be dangerous to work with where confidence and discretion are critical.

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- 5. Conclusions, based on the assumption that this was a representative sampling of published writings not submitted for prepublication review, were:
 - a. The amount of sensitive information that can be considered classified and compromised is extremely small.
 - b. The classified information appears in books and the more detailed articles that appear in journals rather than in articles that appear in the press.
 - c. We do not consider the classified information that we uncovered during this project to represent leaks, and we believe that the consideration of leaks should be kept entirely separate from the matter of prepublication review. Prepublication review concerns writings from known authors who, as CIA experience has shown, are generally agreeable to submitting their material before it is published and deleting sensitive material from it when requested to do so. This person is telling a story or offering judgments and opinions. The leaker is anonymous and reveals facts intended to achieve a specific and usually immediate objective. To lump the two groups together is to do a gross disservice to the legitimate author.
 - d. The persons revealing the classified information formerly held very high positions in the executive branch. These are the persons that one would normally expect to be models of discretion. Thus, it appears that if we require prepublication review it must cover everybody.
 - e. Do the results of this project support the argument for having prepublication review as proposed in NSDD-84? We believe that they do because so little information would have to be deleted. This means that reviews could be done quickly (they averaged 22 days in CIA in 1983); authors would be required to delete very little material from their manuscripts (almost 67 percent of the manuscripts submitted to CIA had nothing deleted in 1983, manuscripts on non-intelligence matters should have even less), and the requirement for prepublication review would send a message to the world at large that the executive branch is working to protect its secrets.
 - f. Should prepublication review be left voluntary? Experience has shown that the great majority of former officals will not write things that they believe are classified. As noted above, there is an occasional author who refuses to submit his manuscript for review. To handle that situation, there must be a way to penalize such persons

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when they publish classified information; otherwise, the system is meaningless. Whether they submit or not, authors can and do make

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid National Security Council		
FROM:	Chairman		25X1
SUBJECT:	Unauthorized Disclosures	and Prepublication Review	25X1
REFERENCE:	SECOM-D-029, 13 February	1984, same subject	
Review Board (PR inadvertent publ efforts of a tas SCI-approved ind now completed it 2. Particuprepublication r disclosures, but	B) concerning the effective ication of classified infolds force to determine how moviduals contained classifications and its report in the attention and its report in the attention of a significant fact formation, or "leaks." I	port by the CIA Prepublication eness of PRB in preventing the armation. It also mentioned the any unreviewed publications by ied information. That group has a attached. tachment is the conclusion that a means of averting unintended or in preventing willful disclosures hope this material will be of	25X1 25X1
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